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A Krimstock hearing is an administrative law proceeding that offers vehicle owners the opportunity to recover possession of a vehicle confiscated by the New York City Police Department (NYPD) during an arrest.〔(A Guide to Krimstock Hearings in NYC - Welcome )〕〔(3rd Amended Krimstock Order, October 1, 2007 )〕 The NYPD has the authority to impound vehicles that it claims were used as an instrument of a crime, and later to seek permanent ownership of these vehicles in civil forfeiture actions.〔 Such forfeiture actions, like the Krimstock administrative hearings, are entirely separate from any criminal charges the vehicle owner may face stemming from his or her arrest.〔 At the hearing, the NYPD must demonstrate (1) that it followed proper procedure in arresting the person and taking the vehicle, (2) that it is likely to win the civil forfeiture action, and (3) that returning the vehicle would cause a danger to the public.〔(A Guide to Krimstock Hearings in NYC - A Quick Summary )〕 If the NYPD fails to demonstrate one of these three things, the vehicle is returned to its owner pending the outcome of the separate civil forfeiture action.〔 The Krimstock hearing process was ordered into creation by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in a 2002 opinion authored by Judge Sonia Sotomayor (who later became a justice of the U.S. Supreme Court).〔(Krimstock v. Kelly, 306 F.3d 40 (2nd Cir. 2002) )〕 The hearings are remarkable because they are a recent example of an entirely new, judicially created, procedural due process right.〔 The hearings are conducted by the New York City Office of Administrative Trials and Hearings (OATH) and presided over by New York City administrative law judges.〔 In 2003, the New York State Court of Appeals mandated that similar hearings be conducted in Nassau County, Long Island.〔(County of Nassau v. Canavan, 1 N.Y.3d 134, 802 N.E.2d 616 (2003) )〕 ==Origin== The NYPD began seizing vehicles upon the arrest of the driver in the 1980s pursuant to a city ordinance that allowed for such forfeiture when the vehicle was used as an instrument of a crime.〔(O'Brien Amicus, Alvarez v. Smith, page 5 )〕〔(N.Y.C. Code Section 14-140 )〕〔(38 R.C.N.Y. Sections 12-01 through 12-19 )〕 Vehicles were regularly confiscated from people charged with both misdemeanors and felonies, ranging from drug possession and solicitation of prostitution to illegal gun possession.〔 Unlike the older New York State civil forfeiture statute, the NYC law did not provide for any type of prompt due process hearing.〔(O'Brien Amicus, Alvarez v. Smith, page 6-7 )〕 Vehicles were held for months and even years while owners waited for the NYPD to bring civil forfeiture actions. The vast majority of the time, however, these forfeiture actions never came. In 1998, for example, of the 1,800 vehicles seized, less than one percent went to trial.〔(O'Brien Amicus, Alvarez v. Smith, page 7 )〕 In 1999, the NYPD added driving while intoxicated (DWI) to the list of crimes that they would impound vehicles for, resulting in thousands of additional seizures. In 2000, the Special Litigation Unit of The Legal Aid Society brought a class action lawsuit on behalf of a number of vehicle owners who had been waiting years for the return of their vehicles.〔 One of those vehicle owners, a named plaintiff on behalf of the lawsuit's certified class, was Valerie Krimstock. Her name became part of the title of that lawsuit, Krimstock v. Kelly — hence the name "Krimstock hearings."〔 In 2002, the Second Circuit heard the case. The majority opinion was written by Sonia Sotomayor.〔 Sotomayor wrote that under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, vehicle owners have a right "to ask what ‘justification’ the NYPD has for retention of their vehicles during the pendency of proceedings, and to put that question to the NYPD at an early point after seizure in order to minimize any arbitrary or mistaken encroachment upon plaintiffs' use and possession of their property."〔 The Second Circuit applied the three-part balancing test of Mathews v. Eldridge. It reasoned that: (1) a significant private interest was affected considering the length of the retention and given that vehicles are "often central to a person's livelihood or daily activities"; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation was great considering that NYPD’s pecuniary interest and the fact that no compensation was paid for the depreciation and replacement costs of vehicles erroneously held; and (3) the Government’s interest in the vehicles not being sold or destroyed pending the forfeiture proceeding could be satisfied by "less drastic measures than continued impoundment," including bond or a restraining order.〔 In consultation with the parties, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York chose OATH, a tribunal in the executive branch of NYC government, which adjudicates matters for a variety of NYC agencies, as the location for the new Krimstock hearings.〔(Krimstock Memorandum Opinion and Order filed August 15, 2007 )〕 By 2004, when the hearing began, the NYPD held over 6,000 vehicles in "legal limbo." Through the continuing advocacy of The Legal Aid Society, the Krimstock hearing process has been refined and the original Krimstock order and judgment〔 has been twice amended by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York.〔〔(2nd Amended Krimstock Order, December 6, 2005 )〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Krimstock hearing」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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